Asset Play with ValueVision Media Inc (VVTV)

It’s 2am and you can’t sleep. You get up, go to the kitchen, grab a drink, turned on the T.V., flip through the channels and come across someone rotating their torso on the latest ab machine. You tell yourself to turn it off, but your brain is numb and hypnotized and you just keep watching those abs crunch..

24hr home shopping – that’s the name of the game for ValueVision Media Inc (VVTV), so grab yourself a cuppa because this analysis is a loooong one.

(You can also skip the whole business part and go straight to the valuation)

Business Summary

VVTV operates in television home shopping, e-commerce, direct mail and online marketing. The company’s live 24 hour every day television programming is distributed primarily through cable and satellite affiliation agreements and the purchase of month to month full and part time lease agreements of cable and broadcast television time.

In addition, VVTV distributes its programming through a company owned full power television station in Boston, Massachusetts. It also markets and sells an array of merchandise through Internet retailing websites, and

The company has an exclusive license agreement with NBC Universal (NBCU), for the worldwide use of an NBC branded name and peacock image through May 2011.

The products sold through the company’s electronic media segment is made up of jewelry, watches, computers and other electronics, housewares, apparel, health and beauty aids, fitness products, giftware, collectibles, seasonal items and other merchandise.

Growth Strategy

Congratulations, you’ve made it past the boring business summary. The way you felt as you read that first section pretty much sums up the business. Frustrating, boring, no growth.

The truth is, home shopping is just so…. 80’s. No wonder the company has been operating at a loss for the past 6 years and that probably won’t change anytime soon.

Although the company is undergoing a restructuring, I don’t believe the amount of fat trimming will be enough to produce a consistent yearly profit. The company has reduced its workforce by 10%, consolidated its distribution and fulfillment operations into a single warehouse and closed a retail outlet store.

“The company’s organization structure was simplified and streamlined(??) to focus on profitability.”

I don’t see this as anything more than just cost cutting from external pressures.

But surely there must be a company or growth strategy, right?. Here is what the quarterly report had to say:

  • optimize mix of product categories offered on television and the internet in order to appeal to a broader population of potential customers
  • continue the growth of the internet business through the innovative use of technology and marketing efforts
  • obtain cost-effective distribution agreements for our television programming with cable and satellite operators, as well as pursuing other means of reaching customers such as through webcasting, internet videos and internet-based broadcasting networks
  • increase the productivity of each hour of television programming by focusing on ways to maximize margin dollars per hour and increase the number of customers within the households
  • enhance our television broadcast quality, programming, website features and customer support
  • leverage the strong recognition of the NBC brand name
  • change the product mix to focus on the female, repeat-purchaser core customer. Reduce high ticket items such as electronics that drives one time customers, but not repeat business.

Of the six strategies, I am dismissing all of them but the last one. I could be blind, but I don’t see anything that Amazon, Google, Home Shopping Network or any other retailer hasn’t already done.

Competitive Moat

If VVTV was a true retailing business, it’s competitive advantage and moat would be nil. However, VVTV is also a broadcaster with its network as its main assets. Nevertheless, competition is a nightmare. It may have the assets of a broadcaster, but the market in which it competes consists of brick and mortar stores, discount stores, warehouse stores, other television home shopping networks, internet retailers, infomercial companies, catalog and mail order retailer and other direct sellers.

Its main competitor however is QVC Network and Home Shopping Network. Both these competitors are much larger in terms of revenue and customers and reaches a broader range of households. VVTV reaches 72 million households.

The average selling price, or ASP, per unit was $224 in the 2008 second quarter and $233 in fiscal 2007. This is about 4x higer than its bigger rivals, but it also means there are more high ticket one time purchasers than repeat customers.

Bottom line – No moat in retailing. Narrow moat in the network business due to the high costs of startup.


  • A majority of VVTV’s cable and satellite distribution agreements are due to expire at the end of 2008

If VVTV is unable to get favorable terms for a new distribution agreement, extra contract fees could eat away at the cash supply.

  • History of losses and high fixed cost operating base.

With this company, a loss is more likely than a profit. However, if a majority of their customers switch to digital, operating costs should go down.

  • The company may be required to issue warrants to purchase a substantial number of shares of NBCU in 2008 and 2009 for renewals or extensions of cable and satellite distribution agreements.

A specific number on the warrants is not provided, but if does happen, shareholder dilution will be high.

  • GE Equity and NBCU hold the largest stake and controls a lot of what goes on
  • VVTV has to pay in cash, the class A redeemable convertible preferred stock issued to GE Equity which has a redemption price of $8.29 per share.

Since the current stock price is 50c, there is no chance that these preferred stock will be converted to common stock. If GE Equity redeems it for cash on March 8, 2009, the cost of all the preferred stock is $44 million. Bye bye cash, hello debt.


From the current state of the company, I can only deduce that management is not in touch with the operations of the business. To get to the point where the company is worth less than its office building is just astonishing.

Insider ownership is at around 5% which is a decent number but it is mostly all through stock options. Even at such fire sale prices, no one seems to be interested in buying.

In fiscal 2007, the company bought back 3.6 million shares amounting to $27 million at an average price of $7.46. I like that management is spending the money to repurchase shares rather than squander it on useless attempts to gain profits.

On Sept 11, 2008, the board of directors announced it had appointed a special committee of independent directors to review strategic alternatives to maximize stockholder value. The key words here are “announced” and “review”. This implies talk without action for the time being.

My views seem to be correct as expressed through this letter by J. Carlos Cannell to the board. In the Oct 27, 2008 letter, Cannell asked that the board declare a $1.20 special dividend to shareholders so that he could liquidate his position rather than live with the current board.

But this is unlikely as

“pursuant to the shareholder agreement we have with GE Equity, we are prohibited from paying dividends in excess of 5% of our market capitalization in any quarter.” – quarterly report.


On November 2, 2007, a fund manager by the name of Jaime Lester of Soundpost Partners wrote a letter to management in which he concluded that the current share price of $4.68 was underpricing the company and he believed the value to be around $6.

On September 24, 2008, fund manager J. Carlo Cannell of Cannell Capital LLC also submitted a letter stating that the current share price of $2.20 was severely underpriced. Cannell also believes the company to be worth closer to $6.

So let’s take a look at a couple of metrics on which we can valuate the company. Keep in mind, with these broadcasting companies, it’s important to calculate their cash flows and assets rather than earnings.

  1. Sales from Full Time Equivalent households (FTE; households receiving 24hr programming)
  2. Net Net Working Capital and tangible assets

Sales Per FTE

A quick way to look at VVTV is by their net sales per FTE. VVTV reaches 72 million households with the average net sales being $7.92 per household. But since people are not spending much nowadays, I’ll assume a low ball net sales of $4 per household. Even this low figure gives a value of $288 million (4×72=288) to the network, which is still 16 times more than its current $18 million market cap.

Net Net Working Capital and Tangible Assets

Net Net Working Capital = Cash and short-term investments + (0.75 * accounts receivable) + (0.5 * inventory) – total liabilities

The following numbers are from the latest quarterly report on August 2nd with adjustments to fit the above formula.

Cash and short term equivalents $59.72 million
75% of Accounts receivable $41.98 million
50% of Inventory $27.82 million
Total Liabilities $73.97 million
NNWC $55.55 million
Diluted shares outstanding 33.57 million
Market Cap (Nov 7) $17.80 million

ValueVision is currently being sold for 30% of its cash holdings and 32% of its NNWC value which satisfies Ben Graham’s huge 66% margin of safety. This is rarely achieved. The NNWC per share value is $1.65 compared to the stock price of $0.53.

However, the NNWC does not include ValueVision’s main assets which is its FCC license, NBC license and its owned property.

Let’s assume the property of ValueVision was affected by the housing crisis by 20%. Reduce the $25 million quoted by Mr Jaime Lester in his letter by 20% to give the office real estate in Minnesota a value of $20 million. Add in the FCC, NBC license and property to NNWC to get the following;

FCC (Boston TV station) $31.94 million
NBC License Agreement $8.99 million
Property $20 million
Assets + NNWC $116.48 million/$3.47 per share

The current market cap is currently only 15% of its low end value. Unbelievable.


The company’s fundamentals and its industry is unattractive, growth isn’t something to rely on, its moat is very narrow, it is risky in the short term due to its obligations, and management seems slow to react. However, all this bad news has already been heavily factored in. The current market cap is worth less than its property or licensing or network or cash. From the market’s point of view, VVTV is doomed to fail.

With no long term debt, this is a true asset play with a potentially huge upside if given enough time. But even if it doesn’t, current valuations and prices indicate a fire sale even if the company was to go bankrupt.

A company being mispriced for 15c to the dollar, you don’t see this very often.

I see a big, fat, straight pitch coming my way.


No positions in any stocks as of this writing.

[tags]VVTV, valuevision, stock analysis[/tags]

  • A friend of mine just emailed me one of your articles from a while back. I read that one a few more. Really enjoy your blog. Thanks

  • The General

    Interesting analysis. I wonder what happens to your analysis if the company is able to successfully renegotiate carriage that provides for a significant reduction in those costs. Current carriage is $128M and is spent on 46M analog and 26M digital. Analog is $2.25/home. Digital is $1/home. The entire broadcast sepctrum moves to digital in 2008. That ‘could provide’ the opportunity for significant decrease in cost. The other item worth noting, is the co’s use of Internet video/Internet. 31% of its sales are driven thru those channels and there is no ‘carriage cost’ associated with those sales. That ‘carriage’ is provided by broadband carriers (aka the cable/satellite co’s).

    Your analysis is fair but think it assigns no possibility of operational success which seems to me be very possible.

  • @ Jeff,
    Glad to have you around.

    @The General
    You’re right in that I give no chance of success to Value Vision. Even if the company is able to renegotiate new contracts, the capital expenditure of the business itself is high and fixed. A switch to digital may lower that cost, but if it requires upgrading or replacing old analog equipment with digital, that’s more cash gone from their balance sheet before it ever provides a benefit.

    I was thinking about the internet sales but came to the conclusion that it just won’t be enough.

    Honestly, I would never buy anything from home shopping because I know the quality is terrible and likely to break. Also, if housewives are the main target, they would be much more likely to watch TV while doing housework rather than the computer.

    There isn’t a single thing that you can buy off shopnbc which you cant get off any other big internet retailer.

    That’s my reason for believing VVTV is mainly just an asset play. Any thing more and that’s a gift.

  • Jae Jun

    Nice read Jae
    I got in this one a little to early, near NCAV price. Like Cannel I was to early, but isnt Buffett usually early too (lol).

  • The General

    Thanks for response. The company already broadcasts in analog and digital so there is no added costs to incur.

    Internet sales represent 31% and has been growing 3x’s the rate of TV.

    Your view of the quality of merchandise is more align with the stereotype vs the reality. ShopNBC is very high quality merchandise.

    Another view of the potential is its largest competitor: QVC. It does $7.2B with OCF 19%+. Amazon does $10B and OCF 8% at best. QVC does 25% of its sales on the Internet…which ranks it in the top 10 of Web retailers; ShopNBC is Top 60.

    Agree there is not much difference between merchandise provided by any of the retailers….but the buying experience utilizing video is more productive than the one dimension provided by most e-tailers.

    Check out…ShopNBC.TV….then compare to or etc. I myself am not much of a shopper but would be more likely to buy from ShopNBC because of the richness of the presentation vs that on the’s.

    Anyway, if ShopNBC did not pay anything for carriage…$128M falls immediately to the bottom line at current sales volume. Management has to figure out how to move toward that objective. I think the chances are good they will be successful.

    The conversation goes something like this. “Mr Comcast, you provide TV and Cable to your subscribers. Most of your content offerings on TV you pay $ for; the shopping channels all pay you…QVC/HSN/ShopNBC pay Comcast @ $80M+/Year for carriage and broadband and 30%+ of their sales are broadband; Amazon, Nile etc pay nothing for broadband yet are beginning to use video….that uses up bandwidth….but you do not charge them anything for that growing use…..”

    Other thing to think of….all the TV broadcasters are seeing advertising dollars shrink as more and more channels are provided, basically carving up the pie into smaller/smaller audiences; also have Internet video further eroding viewers and the very real potential that Internet video could totally replace cable….

    QVC’s $7.2B; HSN’s $2B and ShopNBC $700M are far larger than any (except Amazon, eBay) and combined pay the cableco’s @$600M+ per year for carriage. The cableco’s do not wnat to see that disappear. The current market has destroyed 80% of the market caps of these 3 companies….lots of things are in play right now…will see who emerges from the ruins.

  • @stockmanmarc
    I’m getting more and more tempted to open a position. Just want to wait until my PSD clears out.

    That’s some good info and insights. Now I know that the company is dirt cheap at the moment, but my short and stereotypical vision just cant seem to get beyond the merchandise. If I want electronics, I go to, costco or some other place I know that is cheap. My friends all do the same. Then again, I’m a whole different target. ShopNBC targets the upper households rather than bargain hunters like me.

    But in the end, you are right in that Value Vision could be a 10 bagger if they get their act together. They should not only negotiate better deals, but the board should also DO something. I see no news or press release about the company taking initiatives.

    The thing that worries me in the short term is the convertible preferred stock. If GE decides to redeem it, that’s a huge blow to their cash. Any thoughts on this?

    I’m also looking at Home Shopping Network to see which is the better company. Although HSNI is much more expensive, I do believe that HSNI is in value territory as well.

  • Jim

    Enjoyed your analysis. Although I’m in the same boat as you on this one, I’ve got to comment on a particular aspect of your analysis. Throughout, you evaluate the business as not having a competitive advantage and is in a downward spiral for the most part. At the end of your thesis you take a look at the NCAC and go wow…forget all that other stuff I just said; I wanna buy! So my question is, do you purchase shares in a company solely based on price? Because it seems that you do to me.

  • I respect your opinion and you raise a legitimate point, but I believe it’s based only on parts of one post. I still haven’t bought any shares at this point. Let me go through some examples to clarify.

    If you look at my latest ETN post, you’ll see that I find it extremely cheap but I won’t be buying because of some doubts I have. Although Berkshire has it, I’m not convinced. I believe there are still better opportunities if I look harder.

    Looking at Sears Holdings or Long Drugs (recently acquired by CVS), they are all asset plays. They have zero moat, yet the tangbile assets alone is worth so much more than the current market cap.

    I place VVTV into the same category. The retail side is terrible, but what about the cash, real estate, FCC and other tangible? The business side can spiral down but the assets always have a certain price tag.

    Being sold for 15% of its tangible assets is why Im saying WOW. Even if the business dies tomorrow, you can still make a big profit.

    The opposite could be said for GM and Ford. Look how cheap they have become, but they are in serious trouble with debt, inventory, receivables. If the company went bankrupt, shareholders and bondholders are going to suffer, but its different with VVTV.

    Another example is Oshkosh (OSK) they have dropped so dramatically and my calculations show they are about 80% underpriced, but the level of debt makes me hesitant. Another dirt cheap company at the moment, but for a reason.

    This all brings me to my investing strategies.

    I partake in the following.
    Long term – hold for over 10 years or more. Expect intrinsic value to increase with time.
    Mid term – zero or narrow moat, where I have conviction there is a huge market inefficiency. Sell when it reaches intrinsic value.
    Short term – arbitrage and other special situations.

    VVTV falls into the mid term category. It may take 5-10 years for the market to wise up but I know for a fact that the company is too cheap no matter how bad the business is.

    Sorry for the long response but thanks for raising the point and I hope I’ve clarified myself.

    I’ve also written something similar on Net Net companies here.

  • Jim

    Thanks for your reply. The investment advice I subscribe to is this: enter an investment when a catalyst has happened. In my opinion, the fact that Warren Buffett has entered the company is possibly a catalyst in itself. With that said, on the other end of the stick, I don’t buy just because Warren has either. I don’t know much about arbitrage. I’d like to know more about it. Do you discuss any of the arbitrage techniques that you use on your site. btw, I enjoy your site very much. One of the few value investing sites I’ve found in which you think similarly to myself. Many sites that claim to be value orientated I’ve found are the exact opposite. Your site is put together nicely.

  • I know many investors look for a catalyst, and I don’t know whether it’s because I’m too simple, but I always fall to the idea that a catalyst can be anything. The market realising its pricing mistake could be a catalyst in my books. I just like to find opportunities where its “heads I win, tails I lose a little”.

    I’ve written quite a bit on arbitrage. My most recent one is at

    I’m currently in the PSD merger and had a look at a few more.

  • Jim

    Yes, I agree a catalyst could be any number of things. I just noticed that you have written on the subject of Arbitrage. Thanks for the info and you’ve really got a great site here.

  • Im enjoying the discussion and always looking for someone to correct me.

  • Jim

    Jae, I’m working on a detailed report for CPI Corp this weekend. It’s going to take me a few days but in the meantime I wanted to pass along some numbers and a few thoughts concerning VVTV.

    Here’s the condensed mathematical portion of what I’ve been looking at concerning VVTV:

    Current Market Price: $.51 p/s
    Graham NCAV: $3.06 p/s
    Altman Z-Score: .05

    Concerning the Altman Z-Score: the Z-score carries a 70% accuracy rating. If a company’s Z-Score is below 1.1 the company has a 70% probability that it will declare bankruptcy within the next 2 years.

    BVPS (Intangibles were not discounted): $5.95
    EPV: $-7.53

    As you can see, the EPV is dead on with the Z-Score and is showing how distressed this company is.

    Ending Thought: Let’s hope QVC or a company of the like will make a tender offer for VVTV. Based just on the numbers alone, I don’t see this company’s management doing an effective job at running this company. When EPV is less than BV of the firm it usually signifies this thought. However, I believe it would be wise for QVC, HSN, or others to take advantage of aquiring VVTV at a tremendous discount to what an effective management team could do with this company.


  • Jim

    Here’s an additional thought to why I feel there’s a high probability for them not to be acquired by a competitor and instead filing for bankruptcy and completely going away.

    Things I’m asking myself:

    1) would GE (parent company of NBC) be interested in putting money into the distressed company just to keep their television presence? I don’t believe so, especially considering their situation.

    2) Do I believe they could possibly terminate their agreement with VVTV and choose a competitor to represent their television presence (SNBC)? I haven’t researched the conditions of their contract with SNBC but my first thought is that they could.

    3) If VVTV lost that contract would they still be able to operate with the same presence they have? No. Not unless a new cable channel is formed. I have Direct TV and I don’t see new channels coming out very often.

    Ending thought: In my mind, it’s a higher probability that VVTV could go bankrupt and completely out of business than being acquired by a competitor.

    On that note, I plan on selling my very small stake next week. Would love to hear your thoughts Jae.

  • Jim,
    I’ll try to get to your comments ASAP. Bear with me.

  • Jim

    Sorry, don’t mean to flood you with comments.

  • Jim,

    Regarding the Altman Z-Score here are my thoughts.
    As you say it is 70% correct, but that also means that it is wrong in 30% of the cases. However, I think the incorrect percentage is greater than 30% because the Altman Z-Score was originally created for operating industrial companies. For example PSD is no where close to bankruptcy but it has a score of 1.07. Restaurants also score badly because of a low or negative working capital.

    Same goes for VVTV, by just looking at the score, you would think the company will go bankrupt in the next week, but no such chance. No debt and very asset rich.

    My catalyst for this company is for the board to maximize value again, sell itself, or get bought out.

    As I mentioned, the FCC licenses itself is an incentive for QVC or HSNI to buy them out. But I’m sure there may be some antitrust issues with that.

    In the case of VVTV, Altman Z-Score should be ignored.

    Also, as The General mentioned above, the cable companies get a substantial amount of revenue from these companies so it’s highly unlikely that their contract will not be renewed. To lose a customer like VVTV would be a huge hit for the carriage companies.

  • Jim

    Good point except that there are more than one Z-Score’s. There are 3 different equations depending on what type of business you are testing.

  • I’m no accountant, but from the point of view of elementary psychology, if your reasoning were correct and this were a very undervalued company, why wouldn’t anybody inside be buying? How explain their apparent indifference to what you see as a bargain?

  • Hi Ludovici,

    All I can say is I don’t know. However, management does acknowledge the share price is unreasonably low in their most recent press release about trying to find ways to increase shareholder value.

    But I would like to point out that many other companies are very cheap but insiders have not been buying. Many have actually been exercising their options.

  • Again I am confirmed that the management of this company is in the crapper.

    It looks like the chairman is the typical media industry tycoon trying to assert his power without regard for the company.

    I hope the large shareholders continue to push for a liquidation.

  • Jim

    That represents my Z-Score fairly accurate I’d say and right in line with what I felt would happen to this company.

  • Jim

    Jae, I’ve got a liquidation value of $65.73 Mill. Is that in the same ballpark as what you have?

  • Jim,
    If I completely ignore all cash, I get a value of $56.76 million.

    It also seems like the liquidation or sale I was hoping for in this play is occurring sooner than I thought.

    The quicker it sells itself the better.

  • Jim

    I thought my valuation was conservative 🙂 $56.76 will work for me as well. I’m averaged at $0.51 p/s. Can you tell me why you ignore the cash? I’m not a pro at liquidation valuations but I have a good knowledge base for it but I was under the assumption the valuation would look something like this:

    Cash – 100% realized
    Marketable Securities – 100% realized
    accounts receivable – 75% realized
    Inventories – 50% realized
    Prepaid Expenses – discounted by T-rate because it ends up on the income statement
    PPE – normal discount usually 45%, I use 20% but it’s worth something
    Goodwill – 0% realized
    Intangibles – 0% realized
    Deferred Taxes – 0% realized
    Long Term Investments 15% realized
    Total Liabilities – 100% realized

    Although I didn’t, you could add back in Depreciation/Depletion & Amortization because during the liquidation process, those items no longer expenses and are considered excess cash. I was conservative and decided to have as low a valuation as I could to justify my position.

  • Jim

    You’ve got to excuse me LOL, I’ve been up for 27 hours. I had insomnia last night and couldn’t sleep. I get that every once in a while when I think too hard. Lately, I have been doing just that 🙂 What you meant and I didn’t catch right away was that your valuation is around $116.48 Million. Of course you add cash lol 🙂 Very tired but I can’t go to sleep now otherwise I’ll be up at 1:00am. Sorry about that. Anyway, it does tell me that my valuations are on the extreme conservative side which is exactly where I want them to be and still be able to produce more than 200% MOS. That makes me even more comfortable in my decision. Thanks for the news updates. If I find any, i’ll return the favor.

  • lol too much excitement from all the annual and quarterly reports I assume.

    My calculation is $116.48 Million but I’m subtracting cash because I am thinking that GE will want out of its stake and convert those preferred shares for cash. If that is the case, all the cash is gone. So I’m being conservative and leaving cash out. Either way if you take into account the amount that has to be paid out to GE, its roughly the same.

    So my conservative value is $56 million. I’m averaged at $0.52 but always seem to miss the 20% drop immediately after I buy anything… lol

  • Jim

    lol, me too. I completely missed the 0.30’s. Would have been nice but no need to be disappointed. I’m putting the horse before the cart but I think I’d like to crack open a bottle tonight. hahaha. Have a good night.

  • you guys are a bad influence. i just put in a little order at 45 cents. one way or another, it will teach me something.

  • Do understand that there are wild +/-20% price swings on this one so you have to have a strong stomach.

    I just want to get it out that I’m not trying to influence anyone. I write these ideas and hope there is somebody to refute my argument with strong evidence.

  • Jim

    I know you don’t use beta although I personally do. Beta is 1.91 which is indicative of wild price swings but I believe the potential good outweighs potential bad.

  • have no fear about responsibility. in investing it’s always caveat emptor. assuming you’re not a fiendish deceiver (as in Descartes’ Meditations), i will say that i appreciate the intellectual spirit of your work; i know i wouldn’t have the fortitude for it but am happy to observe, encourage and free-ride.

  • WOW CPI up 125% on the day (12/09/2008)
    I’m kicking myself for not having gotten off my butt and doing some reading but that’s what you get for being lazy.

    Like Buffett says, the biggest mistakes are the ones he missed out on. This could potentially have been one of them for me.

    I’ll look for the next one in the meantime.

  • Jim

    I know it isn’t kosher to say these words but I can’t resist and its all in good nature. I TOLD YA SO!!!

    I’m averaged in at $1.60 and I’m very very happy to say the least. It proves that a value investor can make money even in a recession. This was my largest holding and I’m proud to say that I beat the hell out of the S&P and nearly every day trader this year. I still have a Strong Buy rating on this stock and believe that it will go to $20.00 within the next 1.5 years. I’ve set my stop loss but I definitely am not selling yet.

  • 🙂 yea I need a good rubbing in. My fault for not looking into it further.

    Lesson I learnt is to not get lazy..

    I’ll have to re-evaluate the company for sure now and see.

    Also, if the price has been rocketing up because of fundamentals, I would have to say I missed out on a possible 10 bagger, especially with that huge 50% dividend yield you grabbed.

  • Jim

    The dividend was my catalyst. Although its true that most high dividends are unreasonable assertions and most often don’t come to fruition what separated CPI was that in over 28 years they’ve never lowered or not payed a quarterly dividend.

  • Potax

    long @ 0.381 😀

  • Jim

    Jae, have you seen the latest 10Q? They have $93.17 in liabilities up 25.96% from last quarter. Their Cash is $61.41 Million up 25.76% from last quarter as well. I’ve got a revised liquidation value of $55.91 Million making each share valued at $1.66 per share. A 315% Margin of Safety to today’s closing price of $0.40 per share.

  • I’ve taken a look at the numbers and I’ll write an update soon.
    But the debt doesn’t alarm me at this point. I can’t remember off the top of my head the type of debt but it seems to be a one off thing.

  • Onyx

    Great analysis Jae. any new thoughts on vvtv? seems to have been really moving in the past several weeks? still an opportunity?

  • My latest thoughts are the same as what I wrote in the last post. If VVTV can execute even a little of what they promise, they are set to go. Their major setback have been absurdly high costs which ate into profits, and when they announce the results of all their contract renegotiations, we’ll be able to get an idea of how much money the company can save.

    Save money and then execute strategy. I’m not being optimistic with numbers or anything but the company has been undervalued so much and for so long.

    New management is great! Most of them are from QVC so they have worked with each other and know what works. Strategy is straight from QVC.
    The best compliment is imitation and if VVTV can imitate QVC that would be great.

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